F 153 
.P4Q6 
Copy 1 






REPOUT 



EELATIVJEi i* 



Alll,tJi:^A^Kli, 



READ IN SENATE 



MARCH Sg, 488S. 



M»-. HfLL. Chairmps 



^03:S!!^^^ 




all the cmstitnHon^t pYGfhhns wliirk i» any ii^ay relate t« «xe»&- 
tive patronage: and also of the several acts of the legislature, whick 
have been passed at diflferent times for the purpose of explaining, 
extending or increasing the same. All of which constitutional pro- 
Tisions and acts of the legislature shall b© duly noticed in their 
proper places. 

The 9th section of the 2nd chapter of the constitution of 1778, 
rests in the general assembly the ^' power to choose their speaker^ 
the treasurer of the state and their other officers.]' The "iOth 
section of the same chapter, proT dea that " the president and ia 
his absence, the vice-president with the council, five of whom shall 
be a quorum, shall have power to appoint and commissionate judges, 
naval officers, judges of the admiralty, attorney-general, and all 
other officers, civil and militai-y ; except such as are chosen by 
the general assembly or the people," under the broad and inde- 
finite expression contained in the 9th section above quoted, ^ their 
Other officers." And the very indefinite exception from the ex- 
ecutive apjwintments, in favor of the general assembly, contained i» 
the 20th section, viz. " excpt^t such as are chosen by the general 
assembly or the people." The general assembly, did for some 
years claim and exercise not oidy the power of creating offices, but 
also the prerogative of appointing the officers ; except those ap- 
pointments specially given to the supreme executive council 

The extenP' f^mess of the appointing power thus exercised by the 
general ass^rxiibi/, was much complained of by the members of the 
executive council. But the general assembly notwithstanding those 
tomplaintscontinu?d to create offices, ?,nd to appoint officers im 
sucii manner, and at such times as in their own opinion was best 
calculated to promote the public weal, until thp meeting of the 
council of censors in 1783. That council of censors among other 
things, recommended to the general assembly, the passage of a law 
dividing the appointments thereafter to be xTrade, between the su- 
preme executive council and the general assembly, pursuant t# 
which recommendation, the general assembly did, on the fourtk 
day of April, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-five, pass a» 
act, prescribing the appointments to be made by the general as- 
sembly, and Vf sting in the executive council the appointment of 
all other oficers, whose appointments were not otherwise provided 
for by the constitution. But it must be borne in mind that this law 
is only an act of the general assembly, and like pH otlier legisla- 
tive acts, is liable to legislative alteration, revision or annihilation, 
at any time, when a succeeding legislature, from different views of 
the coisstitution, from different notions of public policy, or froni 
different ideas of the wis!ies of the people, shall deem it t© l»e »^ 
cWsary and proper so to d(r. 



Ihem, a letter from the secretary of the commonwealth, contain- 
ing much information on the Bubject of executive patronage, this, 
letter attached to this report, marked A, if an answer to a caU 
fnade upon that officer, at the last session of the legislature, by a 
•ommittee appointed for the purpose of ascertaining the governor's 
powers to appoint officers, and the diffiirent channels through whick 
those powers have been obtained. This intelligent, venerable and 
•andid statesman, relies on the eighth section of the second article 
•f the constitution of 1790, the law above referred to, several acts 
•f assembly oS^ subsequent date, and on comfuon law principles, t* 
justify the governor in the extent cf patronage, which he at pre- 
sent exercises. So far as the governors poweri are vested by the 
constitution, they ^ust remain unimpaired. 

Bat we presume, that however long the governor may have ex- 
ercised the power of appointing to office, by virtue of any statute^ 
•r common law principle, that the powers thus claimed and exer- 
cised can at any time be reclaimed by the legislature, and other- 
wise disposed of, whenever they shall deem a change necessary 
and expedient. Official powers vested in any officer by the legi*^. 
lature, may, when the public good requires it, be also divested bf 
*fae legislature. 

The peculiar business of legislation, is to pass laws for the reg« 
lation and guidance of all who are concerned in the administratloi 
©f the government, and the ben>:!fit of the people Common law 
is an auxiliary to statute law, and is only to be called upon in ca* 
aes not particularly provided for by the statute. Those official 
powers, which are vested by act of the legislature and common law 
principles only, are not constitutional powers, and therefore fit 
•bjects of legislation. 

We now proceed to the examination of the only constitutional 
provisien relied on by the advocates of executive patronage, it is 
contained in the 8th section of the 2nd article of the constitutioM 
of 1790. By this article the governor is authorised to "appoint 
all officers whose offices are established by this constitution, or shaH 
be established by law, and whose appointments are not herein oth- 
erwise provided for." Preparatory to the construction of this pro- 
vision of the constitution, it may not be improper to take a review 
•f long established and well settled principles of construction ia 
all cases relative to vested rights. In every case where individual 
rights are legally and absolutely vested, they are supposed to remaia 
secure and unimpaired, until it can be clearly and conclusively- 
shown, that those rights have been expressly transferred. While 
your committee entirely approbate the cautionary and scrupulous 
m|i|iB«r wi whi^h atransf«y ^ iadiTidnial righto is «xaai{Me4 and 



decided upon, they earnestly, thougli fespectfully, recommend tt 
the legislature, in construing the powers delegated by the consti- 
tution ; at least to use as great caution and sirictness in faror of 
the rights of the great body of the people. It is not only acknowl- 
•dged by all republican politicians, but it is also positively declar- 
9d by the constitution, " that all power is inherent in the people." 
It is therefore incumbent on every officer of the government, and 
agent of the people, who claim to have been invested by tUe con- 
stitution with the exercise of any power, to show that such pow- 
«r has been expressly vested in him by the constitution ; if he fail 
k) do this, it would be great remissness in the legislature, (wht 
are the immediate agents and representatives of the people,) t© 
indulge him, contrary to the public irtercst, in the exercise of a 
doubtful power. History affords us abundant proof, that the greal 
^ianger to be apprehended, as well in republican governments at 
all others, is the engrossment of power by a few, and its exercise 
fe) them, to the injury of the many. Usurpation is the very mar- 
irow, the bon^, and t'le sinew of despotism — assumption freely in- 
dulged in by an individual, ^nd quietly acquiesced in by the peor 
pie, will in time bring upon the community, all the poisonous ef- 
fects of usurpation in its most terrific form. But to return to the 
words of the constitution of 1790, which are relied on by tiie 
friends of executive patronage, as justifying the executive in tlie 
extent of the appointing power, which he has been in the exer- 
•iseof: " He shall appoint all officers whose offices are estab- 
ished by this constitution, or shall be established by law." 

Is It reasonable to suppose, that the convention in speaking of 
#ie offices established by this constitution, had reference to otii^eg 
"ivhich had long before been established, and the incumbents where- 
tf, had long been aiding in the labors of the government ; the cor- 
rectness of such a construction, wlien viewed in connection with 
all the circumstances which are connected with this provision of 
the oonstitution, might well be doubted. The isolated word estab- 
lish is significant otj found, erect and confirm ; as well as, to, settU 
and fixfiniily that which has been founded and erected It would 
appear that the former of these two constructions, is the sense in 
which the convention had used the word establish in the constitu- 
tion, because it is used in connection with " shall be," evidently re- 
ferring to offices that might " be established by law" subsequently 
to the confirmation of the constitution, and had beyond question ia 
Tiew the appointment of officers to fill offices thereafter to be 
oreated and confirmed. But your committee in drawing their 
•onclusions of the sense in which the convention used ihe word 
" estabhsh" do not rely wholly, nor indeed so much upon the de- 
finition it bears, even as used in connection with the words " shall 
be," as they do upon other important facts which have a direct 
bearing upon the construction given to this provisioa of th© §oa- 
stitution, by the friends of executive |)atroHa^e-. 



If appears by a ftjH examtnatioH ©f the «onstHutfoil of 1*790^ 
and of sevtral acts (*f the legislature, passed immediately thereafter, 
that the convention have expressly vested sucli power of appoint- 
ment in the executive, as it was intended he should absolutely ex- 
trcise ; and also have expressly vested in the gjeneral assembly, 
tuch appointiiii^ power as was designed to be absolutely exercised 
by that body, leaving the appointment of officers not speciall} pro- 
Tided for, to be regulated (as had before been done,) by act of the 
legislature. Constitution Art. 5, Sec. 4, " he s/i«// appoint in eacli 
eounty not fewer than three, nor more than four judges Stc."— 
Same Art. Sec. 10, '* The governor shall appoint a competent 
Bumber of justices of the peace," &.c. Art. 6, Sec. 5, *< The state 
treasurer shall be appointed annually by thejoint voteof the mem<^ 
bers of both houses," &c. In those cases the convention left noth** 
ing to the discretion of the legislature, nor even to the people, 
fluring the continuance of the constitution, however great the pro- 
gress of information and political knowledge might be among the 
citizens in future times. But your committee trust, that they 
will be able to convince every candid, intelligent, unbiassed mind^ 
that all appointments, not specially provided for in the constitution, 
was iiitentled by the convention to be left to the future regulation 
law. The constitution was done in convention, the second day of 
September, one thousand seven hundred and ninety ; and on the 
seventh day of December next following^, the general assembly con- 
vened pursuant to the provisions of said constitution. In this le- 
gislature, there were fourteen members, who had been members 
•f the convention ^ combining as much general information, ae 
Biuch political knowledge, and as great a quantum of integrity, a« 
we ever have seen, or ever expect to see our general assembly 
adorned with, in an equal number of members. 

This opinion will be responded by all who are acquainted witli 
lihe public characters and private virtues of those gentlemen— their 
»ames we insert in the fidlnwing alphabetical order, viz. Jamee 
Boyd, John Breckbill, Lindsey Coates, William Findley, Albert 
Gallatin, John Gloninger, Sabastian Graff, Joseph Hiester, Job* 
Hoge, Thomas Jenks, James 31'Lene, Thomas Mawhorter, Joha 
Sellers, John Smiley. Tlie above facts are stated, and the 
names of those gentlemen are introduced for the purpose of show- 
ing what their opinion was respecting the powers tliat had beea 
▼ested in the governor, by the constitution, as near as can be 
judged of by the enactment of various laws wiiile they were mem- 
bers of the legislature ; and the significant language made use of 
in those laws. It will be proper however, before we proceed to aa 
examination of those laws, to state that Thomas Mifflin, (the pre- 
sident of the convention) was declared to be duly elected governor 
ef this commonwealth, on the 18th day of December 1790. That 
•a the twenty-eighth day of the same month he addressed a mei- 



-m^e to tfte logt^atare, l»r!tta^ tfie ttttentids of the meTObew li^ 

•eriain important duties, requiring: their immediate attention undet 
#ienew structure of the government 

In detailing at considerable length, the objects of most press- 
ing necessity, the governor observes, (Journal of the House of 
Rt^presentatives of that session, page 46,) ** a« to the laws, which 
jequire an immediate revision, on account of the new structure of 
•nr state government, you will find that they principally relate t# 
nine exercise of the executive authority under its former modifica- 
tion." After specifying many official duties that were to be per- 
Ibrmed by the executive authority, under the former modificatio* 
•f the government ; the message remarks, *' In short, to the pre- 
sident and executive council, so great a variety" of appeals and re- 
ports were directed to be made — by them so great a variety of 
commissioners and other officers were to he appointed for specijim 
services — before them, so great a variety of official qualificationi 
and sureties were to be taken — and on them the superintendance 
•f so great a variety of public objects devolved, that a particu- 
lar recapitulation would, at this time be impracticable." It will 
Ibe observed, by an examination of the above extracts from gov** 
#rnor Mifflin's message, that he in a particulai manner notices the 
»i'eat power of appointing officers that had been vested in the ex* 
•cutive authority, under the former structure of government, t» 
jegulate the exercise of which power thereafter, legislative inter- 
position was immediately necessary j consequently, in the oplnioa 
#f the governor, the power of appointing many of the officers wiiick 
Iiad been vested in the executive authority under the former struc- 
ture of government, had not been provided for by the constitu- 
€on ; and were purposely left to the future regulation of law, iii 
fsach manner as propriety and experience ehould dictate. 

Your committee are fully apprized, that some of our state politi- 
cians are disposed to give the most liberal and extensive constructio* 
to delegated powers, that the words of the constitution will possibly 
hear ; while they construe in the must scrupulous and limited man- 
ner, those powers which are reserved by the people, or (which is 
Uie same thing,) the powers that they have not delegated. The 
anxiety with which some people labour in this cause, is much easier 
seen, than accounted for. Will they in this case attempt to say^ 
that the governor was ignorant of the extent of those provisions of 
the constitution, which had vested the powers that had been form- 
erly exercised by the executive authority, in the governor ? Will it 
jbe said by them, that the governor in this case, was unadvisedly 
•ailing on the legislature to provide by law for the exercise of pow- 
ers, that had been previously provided for by the constitution P 
Charges of this kind may be made, but among persons free front 
hxMj, aad beini; acquainted (ha vaoni iPw)»*ylvaj|iaiiji we) wifcli tkc 



aw^racyof hisdiseepHineiit — the soundness efMs judgment— the 
independence of his spntinripnt, and the extent of his political in- 
formation, they will fall lifeless to the ground as fast as they can 
be uttered. 

The character of gorernor Mifflin stands too high to be tarnlsli^ 
«d by an allegation that in the year 1790, he was unacquainted 
with his duties as governor of the commonwealth — that he was ig-* 
norant of the powers which had been vested in the executive by 
the constitution, which instrument he had so sliortly before, net only 
assisted in the formation of, but also, was president of the conven- 
tion, who had conceived, moulded and given to it their final 
finish. 

A committee was immediately appointed, to arran2:e the subject 
matter of the governor's message, from whicli the above quo- 
tations have been taken, and on the 30th day of the same month 
made report. In detailing the subject matter of the ad ]ress that 
required the immediate attention of the legislature, the report savsj 
'' That part of tlie address which enumerates the pow<'rs formerly 
vested in the president and supreme executive council, and wi;ich 
now cease to be operative, your committee conceive ought to be 
referred to a committee to bring in a bill for the purpose of trans- 
ferring^ those powers generally to the governor, until the end of the 
present session, in order to answer the immediately pressing exi- 
gencies until the legislature shall have leisure to enumerate and 
define the executive powers with more precision." A committee 
for this purpose was accordiiigl/ appointed, a bill reported, and 
became a law, by receiving tlie sio;ir.iti're of the governor on the 
fourteenth day of January following, whicJi law is in the words fol- 
lowing VIZ. 

" An act for transferring certain powers exercised by the late 
president and supreme executive council, to the governor of thb 
commonwealth. 

Sect. 1. Whereas by the present constitution of this common- 
wealth, the executive powers of government are vpsted in tlie gov- 
ernor, and it is proper and necessary, that such laws as t'irected 
any dutties to be performed by the former executive authority of 
tids state, should be made conformable to the new orgaiiizaiion of 
*he powers of government* 

Therefore, 

Sect. 2. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Represeu- 
totives, of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General A»» 
sembly met, audit herebv ettact«J by the authority #f tke 8a»e> 



10 

That all and every duty, which by any of the laws of this state, was 
directed to be done and performed by the president, or by the 
president and supreme executive council, not inconsistent with 
the constitution of tliis commonwealth, and not otherwise directed 
by ^he act passed in the pr^-sent session, entitled " An act for 
instituting a board of property, and f r other purposes therein 
mentioned" shall be executed by the oovernor of tliis common- 
wealth, and that every of the laws relative to the duties first 
herein^ before mentioned, shall be, and they are hereby so far 
forth, and no further repealed and made void, Proimled neverllieksSj 
That this act shall continue in force until the end of the present 
session of the General Assembly, and no longer." 

So tenacious was that legislature of the rights of the people, 
so well did they know that the constitution had not vested the 
powers which had been formerly exercised by the executive au- 
thority in the governor, and so well were they convinced of the 
propriety of vesting them elsewhere, as soon as the legislature 
rhould " Jiave leisure to enumerate and define the executive pow- 
ers -vVith more precision " that when legislating on this subject 
"to answer the injmediate pressing exigencies" they only vested 
those powers in the governor to the end o^ that session. But it 
appears that the legislature di<l not, at that session obtain " leisure 
to enumerate and define the executive powers," therefore, on tiie 
thirteenth day of April 1791, (in the same session) a law was 
passed similar in substance, and varying but little in form, by 
whi».'h ant, the powers that had heen formerly vested in the su- 
preme executive council, were vested in the governor, " until the end 
of the next session of the general assembly, and no longer." 'T.'his 
temporary law was continued in force by temporary extensions 
until the 22nd day of April 1794, at which time it was re-enacted 
without limit or duration of time, as almost every other law is. 

The above facts show most clearly and conclusively, that the 
general assembly in eacli of the sessions referred to, were fully 
confident, that the powers which had not been expressly vested 
in the governor, by t!ie constitution ; still remained with the peo- 
ple to be dispose<l of, and regulated by law, in such manner as 
prudence and experience should dictate. Any other conclusion 
would be a direct charge of the grossest ignorance of the provisions 
of the constitution. In the legislature of 1790-91, and those who 
annually succeed them up to the session of 1793-94 inclusive ; 
as well as in the governor, who had in his message called the at- 
tention of the legislature to the necessity of providing by law, for 
the exercise of the powers which had foi'merly been vested in the 
executive authority, and which had not been provided for by the 
< constitution. 



11 

1 charge of this kind, youF eommittee are not prepared to 
make, nordo they believe (when it is recollected, that beside the 
Iduiteen members who had assisted in framinj; the constitution, 
there were many others, of eminent talents and well versed in po- 
iiti-al and l^L-al knowlen.ge,) that any informed person ^viU have 
the hardihood to charge those different assemblies with being ig- 
norant of the constitution, and of doing a work year after year, ot 
supererogation. 

William Bingham, was Speakerof the House of Representatives 
• at the passa-e of the first law, and Richard Peters, Speaker ot 
the Senate. Richard Peters' natural talents, his literary acquire- 
ments and his legal knowledge, has procured for him the confidence 
of the Union, and the situation of a Judge of the United States 
Court, fort the eastern district of Pennsylvania : in the discliarge 
of which duties, he has reflected mucb honor on himself, and 
cveat credit on the bench. Many others who served in these ses- 
sions, have richly merited the highest encomium"^ ; but your com- 
mittee forbear to say any thing further on this point. 

The opinions *of Jarerd Ingersoll, Alexander J. Dallas and 
Thomas Elder, Esqrs. on the subject of appointments to, and 
removal from oflice, remain to be examined. The two former 
trentlemen have argued the case at some lenj^th, and although 
?hey do not positively say, that the exercise of all power not spe- 
cially provided for by the constitution, is by the nature of our 
system of state government constructively vested in the executive ; 
yet from t!ie manner in which they have discussed the subject, 
it would appear that such were their views of the constitution --- 
This view of the subject would be indisputably correct, provided, 
tlie natural original power of appointing all otficers was inherent 
in the governor ; for this plain reason, that wherever right or 
DOwer is naturally inherently vested, it must and does naturally 
remain, until it has been voluntarily divested by lum or them m 
whom it was originally and naturally vested. 

The basis of all republicanism is, that all power is inherent in 
the people, and consequently remains in them, until they, by then 
free and voluntary act do delegate their power to some person or 
persons to be exercised for their use and benefit. That tiie peo- 
ple have delegated their power, must be clearly and unequivocally 
shown by those who claim the possession of them, be-fore they can 
be justified in the exercise thereof, by the friends of freedom — 
Again, these two gentlemen lay it down as a political maxim, tha^ 
the power to remove, is a necessary incident to the power tc 
appoint In this opinion also, your committee beg leave to dil- 
fer from the learned gentlemen, as well as from all others who 
attempt to support this doctrine. From what has already beeft 

* See jyos, 1, 2 and 3, ailached to this repoii. 



said, it will be seen, that whatever powers of appointing to ofliee. 
the govpruor may he vested with, have been delegated to him by 
the pe' pie, or by their immediate agents, to be exercised, not for 
his, but for their bnnefit : to discharge the duties of this delegation 
is not a matte)' of personal choice, but a matter of official duty, 
therefore ministerial. But to remove at pleiisure, is the height of 
despotic tyranny — the two principles are as opposite as the poles, 
and can no more be incorporated into the same political principles, 
thun the most bitter abject tyranny, can with the purest and most 
national unrestrained political freedom. 

The constitution provides only two methods of removing civil 
officers— one by impeachment, the other, by address — the fornier 
of which depends entirely on the general assembly, and the latter 
80 fur as to form, agree to, and present the adch'ess to the govern- 
or, AViio may, or may not comply with the request therein contain- 
ed. But, it is not any where in the constitution, recognized that 
the s^overnor, may remove any officer at pleasure. The latter 
gentleman, *' assured the committee, that he knows of no appoint- 
ment to, or removal from office by any governor of Pennsylvania, 
since the adoption of the present constitution, which, in his opi- 
nion, was not constitutional." Your committee, however, cannot 
resist the idea, that this learned gentleman has in the formation of 
his opinion, adopted what they believe to be a very common course, 
viz. he fias yielded his judt^inent in this case to the common pre^ 
vailirig opinion, without having strictly examined ail the facts ne- 
cessary, to. a full uaderstan.uinii; of t)ie subject. 

Your committee, in this place, would merely observe, that the 
legislature so far from leisurely enumerating and defining the ex- 
ecutive powers with more precision, (aa was proposed by the first 
report made on this subject) have been extending the powers that 
were vested by the constitution, in such manner, that the executive 
department does at this time exercise a patronage to an extent, un-. 
inovvn in any other state of the union ; and (as your committee 
vt-iHy lielieVe 'hey have clearly shown^ inconsistent with the funda- 
mental principles of our state government. Your comiijittee will 
nat attempt, nor is it necessary to draw a fanciful figure, or give 
an eiLaggerated view of (he extent of executive patronage ; but 
th^^y liope that they may be permitted to state, what is the undeni- 
able fact, viz. that the officers in the appointment of the governor, 
who ^re renioveable at his pleasure, (agreeably to the construction 
given to the constitut'on, by the advocates oC executive patronage,) 
are in the anruial. receipt of thousand dollars^ 

What would the people say — What would the legislature think— - 
were the friends of executive patronage, to propose to give the 
governor the annual sum of thousand dollars t(> 



3»(*(Hire his popularity with ? Would they not all revolt at the idea ? 
Would it not be said with mucii propriety, tliat an artful intrigue- 
h\^ governor, with that sum at command, for this purpose, might 
to.nmitmHQy acts of tyranny and oppression, and still have it in 
his power to stifle investigation, and continue his popularity, while 
he continues his oflico hy the liberal distributions of presents ? 
Such suspicions would doubtless be abroad among- the people, were 
it atL< lupted to appropriate. Yet that sum, in money distributed 
for thai purpose by donations, in the most advantageous manner, 
eoulu not su eflectually shield a person's character, or secure his 
popui'irity, as a politic distribution of the numerous offices in *he 
gift of the governor, would 'h> ; because, every person who would 
retelve a fee from tl>o governor, to spread abroad and exaggerate 
his rii'tues, to conceal, d'^ny and extenuate his vices, would bfe 
viewed, not only with suspicion, by the public, but with real con- 
tempt by all who knew the fact. The case is very different with 
©llicers wiio are a{)po!nted by the governor ; instead of detracting 
from, it adds to their respectability ; instead of lessening their 
influence, it gives it a more extensive range; instead of prevent- 
ino; them from, it enables them more elTectually to support the 
character of the governor, to wliom many of them ar« as com- 
pletely devoted, as they possibly could be, were they paid by tlie, 
year for their services. 

Your committee have spoken plainly and freely on this subject., 
because, under all the circumstances of the case, freedom and 
plainness appeared to them necessary — but they do not wish to be 
understood as at-aching blame to any particular person. The gi- 
g^antic growth of executive patronage, can be easily and rationally 
accounted for without individual condemnation ; it is in some degree 
owing to the principles of our government, as well as to humaa 
nature generally. The governor is elected for three years, and 
may when elected, look around him with the purest intentions, to 
see what powers he has been vested with, that can be called into 
operation for the benefit of the people, and the advancement of 
his own character, a matter never lost sight of, nor should it ever 
be ; but we often mistake the means that will lead us to the end. 
He meditates, reflects and fancies public advantages, and enquires* 
whether he has within his power the means to promote them. If 
he has any doubts in his own mind of his powers, to provide a sa- 
lutary remedy in the case ; he takes the counsel of learned and in- 
fluential friends, by whom from the nature of his situation, he is 
generally surrounded. 

Those friends may very probably have a greater personal inters 
«st in an extensive executive patronage, than the governor himself 
has ; consequently the greatest possible range of construction, is 
^iven to his powers- If this was only to happen ©nee, during the 



14 

•ontinuance of the conslitntion, the danger to he apprehend eti 
would not be so great ; but every new case produces a new cause 
for construction ; and every new governor has a new sot of advi- 
sers In this WHj, executive patronage has been swelled and ex- 
tended to the enormous size in which it now exists. Yery different 
is the case with the Ifgislature, many of whose members are elect- 
ed to effect some particular local objects, which eaiploy their whole 
attention, during the session, at the end of which, they return to 
their constituents perfectly satisfied with having effected the purpo- 
ses for whicli they were elected. 

The next legislature is composed of members who were elected 
with similar views — so one session passes after another — and al- 
though composed partly of diflVrent materials, the labors are very 
near the same, viz. each member is most anxious to promote the 
views and interest of his own immediate constituents ; and in the 
bustle of local business, each succeeding session passes off with but 
little attention to matters that might possibly at some remote pe- 
riod, effect the politicai relations of the state at large. Tills view 
of the subject presents a case, fit for the apphcation of the old a- 
dage, " that, v/'iat is every body's business', is nobody's business,'^ 
meaning that matters of general interest are apt to be neglected ; 
because no one individual feels sufficient personal intei'est to invite 
his particular attention to the case, and each one satisiies himself 
with the idea that otlicr persons are as deeply interested in the 
Blatter as he is, and consequently as much bound in duty to attend 
to it, as he is ; and as for himself, he must and will (for the pre- 
sent at all events) apply his time and talents, to etTect soine par- 
ticular matters in which his particular constituents and himself has 
a deep and lasting interest ; to effect which, was perhaps, the 
principal inducement to elect him to the legislature. Owing to 
these causes, questions that are general in their nature, thougii of 
great importance, are almost inevitably overlooked. 

To condemn this practice, would b^ declaring war against our- 
selves — against all the human family — it is in our nature to attend 
first to our own particular necessities and advancements. But the 
case before us, nevertheless shows the necessity of a vigilant watch- 
fulness on the part of the people, over their own concerns, which, 
if neglected too long, may bring much difficulty upon them. 

That the people who are always jealous of their rights, have S9 
long permitted executive encroachments, is quite as easily account- 
ed for. 

The science of government, though the noblest invention of man, 
is no where taught in our country : nor any science connected there- 
with ; that of the law only excepted. And this honorable profes- 



15 

won is but a deduction from governmental science ; the votaries 
whereof may enjoy all the hom-rs and advantages of the profession, 
without paying' the least attention to any of the branches of govern- 
ment, otiier than the administration of the law : nor does the pro- 
fessional duties of this class of gentlemen, require them to become 
the vedettes of the people's riglits, or call upon them to volunteer 
their services as the sentinels and safe-guard against executive en- 
criKichments. Nor is it to be expected tiiat the citizens, whether 
professional or otherwise, will enter into, and produce a correct 
and general analysis of the constitution, pointmg out the particu- 
lar powers that properly belong to, and the particular duties to be 
performed by the different departments of tiie government, and the 
several officers of the state. 

After bringing into viewtlie difficulties that questions of this kind 
seen; to be involved in, it would be natural to ask, where a redress 
for such grievances, is to be had ? — Notv/ithstanding the difficulties 
and embarrassments, that such ?. question must under common cir- 
cumstances be surrounded by on account of the urgency of local 
concerns, and other matters more generally understood, which the 
citizens press upon the Legislature ; the answer must be in the le- 
gislature ; in them tie constitution has vested the power to pass 
laws for the general good, and rhey must, when necessity requires, 
^exercise their constituti(mai powers in geL'eral cases, although 
•very local matter should be thereby neglected for a time. 

Your committee are aware, that they liave all the prejudice of 
•ustom to opp ise, and the interest of the executive adherents, and 
those who liold offices jnder him, to convince all of wiiom the lim- 
it bounds of a report of this kind is entirely insufficient ; their only 
hope is to convince the unbiassed, that the positions they have 
taken, and the conclusions which they have drawn, are in accord- 
ance with common sense, and with tfio true principles of our con- 
stitution. They therefore, offer tiie following resolution : 



THAT it is constitutional arnl expedient to provide by 
law for the election or appointment of an attorney general, and the 
necessary nun»ber of deputies to prosecute in belialf of the common- 
wealth, in the several counties, an auditor general, a secretary 
«f the land office, a surveyor general^ and the number of deputies 
necessary, to do the surveying in the several counties, prothonota- 
ries, registers and recorders, clerks of tlie courts of general quar- 
ter sessions of the peace, of oyer and terminer and general jail de- 
livery and orphans court, prescribing in such law the length of time 
•ach officer shall holdhia office, provided he shall so lon^; behave 
iliimsttlf wall 



Ah 



]X)CTJMET^TS 

'REFERRED TO IN THE PRECEDING REPORTS 



REES HILL, Es%. 

Sir, 



Office of the Commonwealfhf 
Harrisburg, Feb. 19, 1821. 



I have now the honor of enclosing herein such infor- 
motion, as is in my power touching the subject matter of the pre- 
amble and resolution, referred to me by the committee. 1 per- 
haps owe an apology to the committee, for the delny in making the 
eommunication, but I trust they will see a sufficient cause for it, 
in the frequent interruptions arising from attention to other official 
d uties. 

With very great respect, I have the honor to be 

¥#ur and the committee's most obedien" servant, 

ANDREW GREGG. 



THE honorable Messrs. Hill, Kaj?uet and 
Eichelberger, the conmuttee to whom whs 
referred a preamble and two resolutions, au- 
thorizing them to call on the secretary of 
the commonwealth and attorney general, for 
any information in their power, to give, 
touchhig the subject matter of said pream- 
ble, and the first resolution. 

THE undersigned in endeavoring to comply ^vith the terms of 
the propositions contained in the preamble and resolution, sub- 
mitted to him by the committee, would remark, in general, that 
7ie presumes there can be no diversity of sentiment among the peo- 



17 

ile of (his country, respecting the importance of all being made 
acq!iaint«^d w'th the principles of the governrnent, anvl with the 
pjbii'c act? of all w^o havu ajw agency in ils administration That 
thegreat power with which the governor is invested by the consti- 
tutiju, readei'8 it p^iculiarly necessary, t',at his public conduct 
s' ou'd bewmchod with vigiianre, is a subject in which it is also 
beijeved, thei'e is a g'^neral, p(n-haps a nijivf^rsal concurrence of sen- 
tiineiit. To preserve the permanency and p'nty of their ^ovtrn- 
mcnt, the aitcnlion of the people shoidd always be on the 'A'ri, to 
griard against any unconstitutional usurpations in any of its ciepart- 
nients. 

By the pighth sftction of the second article of the constitution, 
the governor is Inv:??ted with power to appoint all officers, whose 
offices a^re established by the constitution, or that shall be esi.ib- 
lisliedby law, and wlsose appointments are not therein otherwise 
provided for. Under this general power, the governor has, ever 
since the commenceTnent of the government under the present con- 
stitution, been in the regular habit of appointing all officers, 
whet ler i.nmediately designated by it, or whose offices- were made 
by law conformably to iis provisions. It is not known in this de- 
partment nor have any record;? been discovered to show, that 
any governor has exceeded his constitutional limits in the exercise 
of this power. 

It may not be considered irrelevant in this enquiry, to refer to 
the constitution of this state which was adopted on the 28th day of 
September 1776, and the practice of the government under it. By 
the ninth section of that constitution, it is declared, that the gen- 
eral assembly s'lall have power to choose their speaker and other 
officers, and the treasurer of the state. By the twentieth section, 
the supreme executive council was vested with power to appoint 
and commissionate judges, naval officers, judge of admiralty, at- 
torney general, and all other officeys, civil and military, except 
such as are chosen by the general assembly and t!ie people, agreea- 
bly to that frame of government, and the laws that might be made 
thereafter ; and also supply any vacancies that might be occasion- 
isd by death, resignation, removal or disqualification. 

It appears that the assembly prior to the meeting of the council 
•f censors, in 1783 had created some offices, and appointed the 
officers te execute them, in the same acts l)y wiiich the ollices were 
treated. This was censured by the council of censors as an un- 
we-rrantable encroacliment on the constitutional rights and powers 
of the executive ; and an act was passed on the 4th of April 1785, 
in conformity with the decision of the council of censors. The 
second section of this act designates particularly the officers to be 
appointed by the assembly, and declares the ai^pointment ^f aJJ 
C 



18 

other officers necessary for the execution of the laws, to be veked 
in the supreme executive council, with tlie exception of such as 
were specially reserved to the people, or plainly directed by the 
constitution to be otherwise chosen or appointed. There is no 
evidence of any subsequent interference with the oxecutive council 
in tlie exercise of its power of appointment, during the continuance 
of the government under that constitution. 

On the organization of the government under the present con- 
gtitution, an act was passed on the 14th of January, 1791, di- 
recting tl.at ail and every duty which by any of the laws was di- 
rected to be done and performed by the president and supreme ex- 
ecutive council, not inconsistent with U-e constitution, nor other- 
wise directed by an act for instituting a board of property, should 
be executed by the governor. By an act passed on the 13th of 
April, 1791, it was enacted, that in addition to the powers vested 
in tiie governor, by the constitution, he should have and exercise 
all the power that by any law or laws was vested in the supreme 
executive council, or in the president or vice-pi-esident thereof, 
unless the same should be vested in some other person, or be in- 
consistent with the provisions of the constitution. This power was 
continued by various subsequent acts passed, on the 21st of Sep- 
tember, 1791— on the 28th of March, 1792— on the 11th of 
April, 1793— and on the 22d of April, 1794. Any further pro- 
gress of these acts has not been pursued, it seeming to be under- 
stood that by these various enactments, the exercise of that power 
had acquired the force of common law, no question having ever 
been made, as far as it is known here, of its incompatibilitj with 
the constitution or the laws made under it. 

A reference to these acts Is made to show that if any appoint- 
ments not specially designated in the constitution, nor by law, but 
rendered necessary by the circumstances of the case or the com- 
mon consent of the people, were made by the supreme executive 
council, such power now Is legally vested in the governor. It is not 
however intended by thi:. to insinuate, that there are any such offi- 
ces, or that any such appointments have been made. It Is acknow- 
ledged that no special act has been found estabhshlng the various 
offices of courts of justice, with the exception of judges, and those 
that are elected by the people, but they are all recognized in the 
third section of the sixth article of the constitution, and in all the 
various acts of assem!)ly, estabhshlng courts. When the constitu- 
tion says, that prothonotarles, clerks of the peace, &c. shall keep 
their offices at a particular place, it is a constitutional acknow- 
ledgement or declaration tliat such offices do exist, and that there 
must be oiFiccrs to fill them. The power of appointing these offi- 
cers, Is of course vested "in the governor, under his general power 



19 

of appointment, agieeably to the eij^hth section of the second arti- 
cle of the constitution before quoted. 

The second act passed by the assembly, under the constitution 
of 1776, was to revive and establish courts of justice ; and among 
the first acts of the executive council, was the appointuient of pro- 
tlionotaries, clerks of sessions, of orphans courts, registers, &.o. 
The power of making these appointments, was vested in, and ex- 
ercised by tlie supreme executive council, until the change of gov- 
ernment took place, and that power having been transferred to the 
governor by various acts of assembly as herein before recited, 
may be considered as legally vested, even had it not been so ex- 
pressly given him by the constitution. 

This description of officers, with all others, the manner of 
whose removal from office is not pointed out in the constitution, 
have been considered removeable at the will of the governor, and 
the tenure of their appointments has invariably been so expressed 
in their commissions, that they were to hold till their commissions 
were revoked by the governor, or by other lawful authority, super- 
seded or annulled. The power of removal from office appears in- 
cident to the power of appointment, and was exercised by the su- 
preme executive council, under the constitution of 1776, and by 
each succeeding governor of the state under the present constitu- 
tion. 

It is presumed, the committee will not require the enumeration 
of a multiplicity of cases to evidence the genend exercise of the 
rig!it of judging, and power of removing. A reference might be 
made to many instances, in which it has been applied to officers 
in the various departments of government. A few "will be selected 
to show that such lias been the practice. 

The person who held the offices of prothonotary, clerk of the 
sessions, and oyer and terminer, in Huntingdon county was remov- 
ed by a resolution of the supreme executive council, and by a sub- 
sequent resolution, the same person was removed from the office of 
clerk of the orphans court. The receiver general of hind office was 
removed by the first governor of tAe state, and this wa> such a noted 
instance, andexcited so much interest, that it is still fresh in the re- 
collection of those who were conversant in the affairs of the state a . 
that time. Early in the administration of the second governor, the 
inspector of flour in Philadelphia was removed. This, it is believed, 
is the first case in which the power of removal was disputed. Tiie 
question was referred to Messrs. IngersoU and Dallas, and a state- 
ment of the case with their opinion, is hereto annexed. Removals 
since shat period have been more frequent. A surveyor general 
has been removed, a recorder of deeds has experienced the same 



^0 

fate, and the list might bo swelled with tlie cases of auctioneers, 
inspectors, prothonotaries, ^^c. &.c. There is no evidence in this 
office^ to show, that any le^al opposition has been made to any of 
these removals, but it may not be improper to mention a report, to 
\Yhich common fame has given currency, that a question recently 
arose on the removal oi the inspector of salted provisions, in Phi- 
ladelphia, and was decided by the supreme court, that the power 
as exercised, was constitutionally vested in the governor. 

The undersigned has not been able to discover any alteration, 
that, in his opinion might be constitutionally made in appoint- 
ments to, and continuance in office, of any of the offices now in the 
gift of the governor. His power is general, \vith the exception of 
the cases mentioned in the constitution. Whether he is the best 
depository for that power, is a very diffi:rent question, and one 
on which he should feel great dehcacy in giving an opinion. Tiie 
diffirrent modes, adopted by the different states, of the trust and ex- 
ercise of that pov/er, furnish a very striking evidence of the diffi- 
culty of settling the question. It is certainly a very important 
trust to be committed to one man, and yet we find complaints of 
abuse, have perhaps, been heard in every government that has 
had recourse to plural executives, as a security against the evil. — 
It is yet in the recollection of many that dissatisfitction with the 
executive council of the constitution of 1776, produced that under 
which we now live, and so strong did the current then run in fa- 
vor of a single executive and individual responsibility, that no ar- 
guments could prevail in favor of a division of the power, or se- 
curing against its improper exercise, by subjecting his appoint- 
ments to some concurring department of government Universal 
experience proves the importance of a watchful eye being kept on 
this power wherever it is placed. The vigilance and virtue of the 
people, are the best security against its abuse. 

Having given this general view of the subjects embraced in the 
preamble and resolution, such a detailed statement is now present- 
ed of offices and appointments, as appears more especially to have 
been intended by the resolution. It was thought it. might be de- 
sirable to tlie committee to have all the offices with their different 
tenures before them in a single view. 

Appointments by the governor, and for what period of service^ 
with reference to the authority under which they are made, that 
is to say. 



2i 

Secretary of the CommonweaWi, daring the goveruor'a continuance 

in office — See 15th Section of the 
2nd Articleof the constitution. 

Judges of the Sajireme Court y during good behavior. 

President Jadgas of the courts of common pleas in the several judicial 
dist^icis of the commonwealth^ during good behavior. 

Associate Judges of the courts of common pleas in the several counties 
of the state, during good behavior. 

Additional Judges of the district court of the city and county ofPhila- 
delphia, see acts of assembly of the 3d of March 1811, 
and the I3tli of March 1817, for the term of four years. 

Associate Judges of the same court y by the same act, for the same 
period. 

Additional Judges of the d.istrict court of the city and county oj Lan- 
caster , see act of assembly of the 27th of March 1820, 
for four years. 

Attorney General, during pleasure. 

) 
Clerks of the supreme courts in several districtSj during pleasure. 

Prothonolaries of the courts of common pleas^ and Clerk of the or- 
phans^ courts, general quarter sessions of the peace, and of 
oyer and terminer and jail delivery, holden by the judges 
oj the court of common pleas, during pleasure. 

Clerks of the my yors courts in the cities of Philadelphia, Lancaster 
and Pittsburg, during pleasure. 

Recorders of the said several cities, during good behavior. 

Aldermen of the said cities, during good behavior. 

Justices of the Peace in the several counties^ during good behavior. 

Sheriffs and Coroners in the several counties, for three years. 

Recorders of deeds in the several counties, during pleasure. 

JVbtaries Public, during good behavior, see act of assembly of 
March 5th 1791. 



Interpreters of Foreign Languages j during pleasure 

Secretary of the Land O^ce and Surveyor General, for three years, 
removeable from office by the governor on the ad- 
dress of both houses of the leojislature, see act of the 
29th of March, 1809, volume 5 Smith, page 48. 

Auditor General of Jlccounh for a like period, and removable in like 
manner, see act of the 30th of March 1811, 5th vol - 
ume, page 237. 

Jiuctio7ieerSj the president and council to appoint three during plea- 
sure, volume 1, page 509, 23d September 1780. 

The appointment of a fourth Auctioneer, authorised by 
act of assembly of the nineteentli of March, see 2nd 
volume, page 48 1 , during pleasure. 

The appointment of two additional Auctioneers au- 
tliorlsed I y act of assembly of the twenty-seventh of 
March 1790, same volume, page 520, during pleasure. 

The appointment of an auctioneer for the sale of 
horses, cattle and carriages, within the city of Phila- 
delpiiia, authorised by an act of assembly of the tenth 
day of April 1799, volume 3, page 379, during plea- 
sure 

The appointment of an auctioneer for the sale of books, 
stationary, paintings and prints, within the city and 
liberties of Pliiladelphia, see act of assembly of the 
25tii January 1816, during pleasure. 

The appointment of two auctioneers, in and for the 
city of Pittsburof, authorised by acts of assembly of 
the 28th of March 1814, page 307, and the 22d 
March 1820, page 90, during pLasure. 

Inspector of beef and pork, shad and herring, by the governor, 
during pleasure, see volume 1, page 170, volume 2, 
pages 476, 498, volume 3, page 258, volume 1, page 
418, volume 5th, page 121. 

Of staves and heading, boards, plank, timber and 
shingles, volume 1, pages 222, 277, volume 2, page 
528, volume 3, pages 258, 268, 314, volume 5, page 
147, volume 2, page 505, during pleasure. 



Of flour in and for the citj and county of "Philadel- 
phia, volume I, pages 528 and during pleasure 

Of flour for the ^Yestern counties, volume 3, page 52, 
during pleasure. 

Of butter and hogs lard, volume 4, pages 104 and 404, 
dui'iiig pleasure. 

Inspector of ground black oak bark, volume 4, page 194, during 
pleasure. 

of gunpowder, volume 3, pages 240, 498, during pleasure. 

of salted fish in the towns of C(^lumbiaand Pittsburg, see 
act of the 25th February, 1818, during pleasure. 

Measuterof corn and salt, lime and coal, 2d volume, pages 350, 
441, and 442, during pleasure. 

Superintendent of the gunpowder magazine, 2d volume, pages 402 
403, and 404, during pleasure. 

Reg;ister of German passengers, volume 2, page 329, during plea- 
sure. 

€r imagers and Inspectors of domectic distilled spirits; two to be ap- 
pointed during, pleasure, act of 14th March, 
1814, page 100. 

Keeper of Wei2:h(s and Measures aid Sealer of dry measures, differ'* 
ent officers, during pleasure, to reside in the city and coun- 
ty of Philadelphia, volume 1, pages 18, 19,44. 

Fort Physiciany Lazardte Phjsician, Health Officer and Quarantine 
Masfer, may be removed fronj office by the Governor at 
the request of the members of the board of health, or a 
majority of them, volume 4, page 304. 

Maittr and Assistant Wardens of the port of Philadelphia, for one 
year. ^^ 

Very respectfully, 

I have the honor to be, 
Gentlemen, 
Your obedient servant, 

ANDREW GREGG. 
^hrmr^ldth, 1821. 



«4 

( 1 ) 

[case.] 

Thomas Mifflin, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsjlva- 
ttia, executed a commission under the state seal, date^i January 14tn, 
1799, to James Reed, as Inspector of bread and flour for the city 
and county of Philadelphia, to hold said office for the term of f*iir 
years, if he sliould so long behave himself well. The period of Go- 
vernor Mifflin's administration terminated on the 16tb day ci I^e- 
cember, 1799, by effluxion of time, and Thomas M'Kean was the 
next day proclaimed Governor. 

Question. Does the above commission continue in force for the 
term of four years, or did it determine with the power of the Gcver- 
nor? See first volume Pennsylvania Laws , 889, section 19. 

I am clearly of opinion that the commission of Mr. Read may 
be superseded' at the pleasure of the present Goven.or. The Le- 
o-lslature might create the office, the constitution ascertains the 
terms of the commission. Governor Mifflin could not give the ap- 
pointment, except in the manner prescribed in the coastitution, and 
this officer is not one of the enumerctei instances which are to be 
during: good behavior, for a term of years, or appointed by the legis- 
lature, and of v'ourse falls under the only remaining class revocable 
at the pleasure of the Executive. 

JARE.D IiNGERSOLL. 

March \st, 1800. 



Lancaster, March Isf, 1800. 

The ease naturally presents two principal objects for inquiry. 
Ist, "VVlietlier the Legislature has power to prescribe the duration 
•f commissions issued to the public Mfficers? 2d,iWhether it is in 
the power of the Governor, for the time being, to grant a commis- 
sion for any term of years, so as to be binding on his successor.'' 

1st. The constitution vests in the Governor the exclusive power 
•f appointing, and it follows as an incident, of removing all public 
•fficers whose commissions are not otherwise provided for by the 
constitution itself. There are, indeed, but three tenures of office 



recognized by the constitution; 1st, Judicial offices, which ai'e to be 
held during good behavior; 2d, civil offices which are to be held at 
the pleasure of the Governor, and 3d, fiscal offices, wliich are con- 
stitutionally limited in point of time, with the exceptions of the se- 
cretaries, sheriffs and coVoners, and other enumerated offices which 
are to be held under the appointment of the legislature, or in such 
other manner as is, or shall be, directed by law, It is clear, there- 
fore, that the legislature cannot appoint to any offices which are 
not expressly designated, as exceptions to the general authority of 
the governor, and I think it necessarily follows that they cannot, in 
any other cases, interfere with his general authority of removal. 
The executive power of removal, and even the power of appoint- 
ing, would become, in a great measure^ nugatory, if the duration of 
the appointment after it was made depended on legislative regula- 
tions; for if the legislature can declare that a man shall continue 
in office for four years, the declaration may, with the same 
reason, be protracted for forty years, nay, speaking indefinitely, it 
might vest every office for the life of the officer, or during his good 
behavior, and thus the power, control, and responsibihty, intended 
for the executive magistrate, w^ould be essentially transferred to 
another department of the government. Under this impression, it 
appears to me that, though the legislature may establish temporary 
offices, or abolish any office not depending on the constitution, yet 
they have not a power lo prescribe the duration of any commission 
regularly issued for any permanent civil office by the governor. 

But it may be proper to add, that the law in question was, in oth- 
er views, unconstitutional. For instance, in assuming the power to 
nominate and appoint the officer, as well as to prescribe the dura- 
tion of his commission,* and even in the view now contemplated, it 
only respects the actual occupant and does not extend to his suc- 
cessors. In the case of a vacancy, indeed, it was to be supplied by 
justices of the peace *' until the Assembly shrJl appoint anotiier in- 
spector." Thus, excluding in one word, at least, the idea of any 
tenure for years, though the assembly might not re-appoint, and 
the truth is, that since the fii'st appointment by the law the legis- 
lature have never attempted to exercise the power of appointment, 
but it devolved (without any legislative cession) upon tlie supreme 
executive council, to whom, in the opinion of the council of cen- 
sors, it constitutionally belonged. ^ 

If the regulation was unconstitutional uWer the old frame govern- 
ment, the same reasons render it inconsistent with the provisions oi 
the existing system, and it is, of course, repealed or annulled. 

2d. On the second object of inquiry, I premise that, if the law 
is repealed or annulled, by force of the existing constitution, the 
late governor could derive no power from it ; and if the legislaturfc- 

*9ee a declaration act on this point, p.-isssd the 4. h April 1785, 

D 



m 

could not prescribe a duration to the commission, I think they are 
equnllyincompetentto authorize tho governor to do so. The power 
of the executive depends implicitly, aiid entirely, on the grant of 
the constitution. The leg:islature and the governor cannot, there- 
fore, jointly, or separately, make the power an iota mgre or less 
than the constitution has made it, nor direct or modify the exercise 
of it, in a manner different from the obvious design and meaning 
of the grant. The power of appointing to office, and of removing 
from office, is gi anted to the Governor for the time being, upon 
principles of public pohcy and personal responsibility, but if it is 
construed so as to authorize the governor's issuing a commission for 
a term of years, all public policy and personal responsibility are at 
an end. No greater latitude of construction will be necessary to 
authorize the executive magistrate to confer commissions for life, 
or in tail ; and every Governor, at the close of a triennial adminis- 
tration, must have it in his power to impose his own partizans upon 
a rival successor, who may know nothing of the merits, and ought 
not to be made answerable for the conduct of officers thus appoint- 
ed witl.out his previous participation, or subseq^uent assent. 

Hence, I conclude, that the governor for the time being has not 
the power to grant a commission for any term of years, so as to be 
binding on his successor. 

And the general result, upon the case stated, is, that the commis- 
sion of Mr. Reed, may be superseded at the pleasure of the present 



(3) 

Office of the Commonwealth ^ 
February 21 St J 1821. 
REES HILL, Esq, 
Sir J 

Tn examining the law respecting escheats, passed orx 
the 29th of September, 1787, I find the suprenje executive coun- 
cil, were authorized and^directed to appoint an officer to be called 
Eachealor General, to hold his office for seven years, if he should so 
long behave iiimself well. And this office has been filled by succes- 
sive appointments since that time. The present incumbent wa& 
appointed on the 14ih September, 1815. — I have thought it neces- 
sai'y to mention this, to render more perfect the list already furn- 
ished 

Yery respectfully, 

I am yours, 

ANDREW GREGa 



sr 



(*) 



Gentlemen, 



I take the honor of acknowledging the receipt of 
Col. Hill's letter, covering the preamble and resolutions therein re- 
ferred to, and have taken time to collect on the subject such infor- 
mation, as was within the reach of my limited means. Having done 
so, I now respectfully assure the committee, that I know of no ap- 
pointment to, or removal from office, by any governor of Pennsyl- 
vania, since the adoption of the present constitution, which in my 
opinion, was not constitutional. 

I am, Gentlemen, 

Tour respectful and 

Obedient servant, 



THO. ELDER. 



To Rees Hilly Condy Ra^uet and 
Frederick Eichelberger, Esquires 
Committee of Senate, Sfc. 

Hanisburg, Feb. '26th, I82L 



'\ 



WB. 



.^. 



